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TRANSLATION 
  
What is Psychology?     
Georges Canguilhem 
 
The psychologist seems to be more embarrassed by the question “What is psychology?” than 
the philosopher by the question “What is philosophy?” The reason is that philosophy is 
constituted by the question of its sense and essence much more than it is defined by any 
answer to it. The fact that this question is reborn incessantly without ever admitting a 
satisfying response is, for those who would like to call themselves “philosophers,” a reason 
for humility and not a cause for humiliation. But, for psychology, the question of its essence, 
or more modestly of its concept, also brings into question the very existence of the 
psychologist since, lacking the ability to explain what he is, he has difficulty explaining what 
                                                     
 Georges Canguilhem’s “Qu’est-ce que la psychologie?” was first delivered at the Collège Philosophique on 
December 18, 1956. It was then published in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale in 1958. Eight years later, in 1966, 
it appeared in the second volume of the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, which bore its title. This volume included a 
“Foreword” by Jean-Claude Milner, a “Supplement” (“Les graphes de Jacques Lacan, commentés par Jacques-
Alain Miller”), and contributions by Robert Pagès, Alain Grosrichard, Chevalier de Merian, Serge Leclaire, and 
Thomas Herbert. Translation source: Georges Canguilhem, “Qu’est-ce que la psychologie?” Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January-March, 1958), 12-25. Translator’s note: Translation work is 
labor-intensive and tiring, on a good day. Here, I have tried to stay as close as possible to the letter of 
Canguilhem’s text. For example, unlike other translations (in both English and Spanish), this one reproduces all 
the section- and paragraph-breaks of the original 1958 article. And while works mentioned in the body of the 
essay are presented here under the title of their English translations (when available), all references have been 
preserved in their original French (mainly to protect the accuracy of page references). In spite of my largely 
literalist approach to translation, however, there were moments I was forced to abandon this path. For the sake 
of readability, for instance, I made some stylistic calls. I changed a few commas to semi-colons and, once or 
twice, introduced a period. I added quotation marks in places where the mention/use distinction was helpful and 
appropriate. I relied on dashes and parentheses to break up some the longer and more cumbersome sentences in 
the original text. I also translated idiomatic expressions in French into idiomatic expressions in English given 
that a strict attachment to the literal meaning would have resulted in a bizarre, and bizarrely fractured, style 
entirely foreign to Canguilhem himself. Finally, where translation proved particularly onerous, I opted for 
presenting the original French alongside the English translation in bracketed form. Special thanks to Rabih 
Hage, Simon Truwant, and Ellie Anderson for aiding and abetting in this translation. 
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he does. He can justify his importance as a specialist only by pointing to an always-debatable 
“efficiency” [efficacité]. And some would not care one bit if this “efficiency” engendered, in 
the philosopher, an inferiority complex. 
In saying of the psychologist’s efficiency that it is debatable, we do not mean that it is 
illusory; we simply want to note that it will remain, without doubt, ill-founded as long as it 
has not been shown to be really due to the application of a science, which is to say, as long as 
the status of psychology is not fixed in such a way that one would be forced to take it for 
something more and better than a composite empiricism that has been codified, literally, for 
the sake of teaching. In fact, from a good number of works in psychology one gets the 
impression that they add up to a philosophy without rigor, an ethics without exigency, and a 
medicine without control. Philosophy without rigor because it is eclectic under the pretense 
of objectivity; ethics without exigency because it teams up with ethological experiences that 
are themselves without critique, e.g. those of the confessor, of the educator, of the leader, of 
the judge, etc.; and medicine without control because of the three kinds of illnesses most 
unintelligible and least curable—i.e., illnesses of the skin, illness of the nerves, and mental 
illnesses—the study and treatment of the last two have always furnished to psychology its 
observations and hypotheses. 
Therefore, it seems that in asking “What is psychology?” one poses a question that is 
neither impertinent nor futile.  
For a long time we have looked for the unity characteristic of the concept of a science 
in the direction of its object. The object would dictate the method used for the study of its 
properties. But this was, at bottom, to limit science to the investigation of a fact [un donné], to 
the exploration of a domain. When it became clear that every science more or less gives itself 
its fact and appropriates for itself, in this way, what one calls its “domain,” the concept of a 
science became progressively more focused on its method than on its object. Or more exactly, 
the expression “object of science” acquired a new sense. The object of science is no longer 
only the specific domain of problems and obstacles to resolve, it is also the intention and 
target of the subject of science, it is the specific project that constitutes a theoretical conscience 
as such.  
One could respond to the question “What is psychology?” by making appear the unity 
of its domain in spite of the multiplicity of methodological projects. To this type of response 
belongs that brilliantly given by Professor Daniel Lagache, in 1947, to a question posed, in 
1936, by Édouard Clasparède. 1  The unity of psychology is here sought in its possible 
definition as general theory of behavior—a synthesis of experimental psychology, clinical 
psychology, psychoanalysis, social psychology, and ethnology. 
                                                     
1 Édouard Clasparède, L’unite de la pscyhologie (Paris: PUF, 1949). 
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On a closer look, however, we notice that perhaps this unity looks like a pact of 
peaceful coexistence signed by professionals more than a logical essence obtained by the 
revelation of constancy across a variety of cases. Of the two tendencies between which 
Professor Lagache want to find a solid accord—i.e. the naturalist one (experimental 
psychology) and the humanist (clinical psychology)—, one gets the impression that the 
second carries, for him, more weight. Without a doubt, this is what explains the absence of 
animal psychology from this review of disputing parties. True, we see very clearly that it is 
contained by experimental psychology—which is in large part a psychology of animals—, but 
it is contained there only as material to which the method is applied. In reality, a psychology 
can be considered “experimental” only on account of its method, and not on account of its 
object. Meanwhile, and despite appearances, it is on account of its object more than its 
method that a psychology is said to be “clinical,” “psychoanalytic,” “social,” “ethnological.” 
All these adjectives are indicative of one and the same object of study: man, loquacious or 
taciturn, sociable or unsociable. In light of this, can one rigorously speak about a general 
theory of behavior as long as the question of whether there is continuity or rupture between 
human language and animal language, between human and animal society, remains 
unsolved? It is certainly possible that, on this point, it may not be philosophy that gets to 
decide, but science, in fact many sciences, psychology included. But in order to define itself, 
psychology cannot prejudge what it is called upon to judge. Otherwise, it is inevitable that in 
presenting itself as the general theory of behavior, psychology will incorporate some idea of 
Man. Hence, it is necessary that we allow philosophy to question psychology about where 
this idea comes from, and whether it may not be, ultimately, from some philosophy.  
Because we are not psychologists, we would like to broach the fundamental question 
posed here via a different route. That is to say, we propose to explore whether or not the 
unity of a project can confer to the different types of disciplines called “psychological” their 
eventual unity. But our method of investigation demands a step back [un recul]. Exploring 
how various domains overlap can be done by their separate investigation and by comparing 
them with one another in the present (about a decade in the case of Professor Lagache). 
Exploring whether certain projects coincide demands that we extract the sense of each of 
them, not at the moment it gets lost in the automatism of application but at the moment it 
emerges from the situation that provokes it. Searching for an answer to the question “What is 
psychology?” becomes, for us, the obligation of sketching a history of psychology, one 
considered of course solely in relation to its orientations and in connection with the history of 
philosophy and the history of the sciences; a history necessarily teleological since it is 
destined to convey to the posed question the assumed original sense of the diverse 
disciplines, methods, or enterprises whose current disparity legitimizes this same question. 
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Psychology as natural science 
Although etymologically “psychology” means science of the soul, it is remarkable that an 
independent psychology is missing, in both idea and fact, from the philosophical systems of 
antiquity, where the psyche, or soul, is taken to be a natural being. There, investigations of the 
soul find themselves split between metaphysics, logic, and physics. The Aristotelian treatise 
On the Soul is in reality a treatise of general biology, one of his writings consecrated to 
physics. After Aristotle, and according to the tradition of the School, the “Courses of 
Philosophy” at the beginning of the 17th century still discuss the soul in the chapter on 
physics.2 The object of physics is the natural and organized body that has life as a potentiality 
[ayant la vie en puissance]. Thus, physics treats the soul as the form of the living body and not 
as a substance separate from matter. From this point of view, a study of the organs of 
knowledge—that is to say, of the external senses (the five usual senses) and the internal 
senses (common sense, fantasy, memory)—does not differ in any regard from a study of the 
organs of respiration or digestion. The soul is a natural object of study, a form in the 
hierarchy of forms, even if its essential function is the knowledge of forms. The science of the 
soul is a province of physiology, in its original and universal sense as a theory of nature. 
 It is to this ancient conception that an aspect of modern psychology returns without 
interruption: psycho-physiology (for a long time exclusively considered as psycho-neurology 
but today, also, as psycho-endocrinology) and psycho-pathology (as medical discipline). In this 
respect, it does not seem superfluous to recall that well before the two revolutions that 
permitted the development of modern physiology, those of Harvey and Lavoisier, a 
revolution no less important than those produced by the theory of circulation and respiration 
was set in motion by Galen when he established, clinically and experimentally—after the 
doctors of the School of Alexandria (Herophilus and Erasistratus), against Aristotelian 
doctrine, and in accordance with the anticipations of Alcmaeon, Hippocrates, and Plato—that 
it is the brain and not the heart that is the organ of sensation and movement, and the seat of 
the soul. Galen truly founds an uninterrupted filiation of research, an empirical 
pneumatology for centuries, in which the fundamental piece is the theory of animal spirits, 
and which was dethroned and superseded at the end of the 18th century by electro-neurology. 
While decidedly pluralist in his conception of the relationship between the psychic functions 
and the encephalic organs, Gall proceeds directly from Galen and dominates, in spite of his 
extravagances, all investigations of cerebral localizations during the first sixty years of the 19th 
century, until Broca.  
 In sum, the psychology of today, as psycho-physiology and psycho-pathology, always 
returns to the 2nd century. 
                                                     
2 Cf. Scipion De Pleix, Corps de Philosophie contenant la Logique, la Physique, la Métaphysique et l’Ethique (Genève, 
1636 [1st ed., Paris, 1607]). 
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Psychology as the Science of Subjectivity 
The decline of Aristotelian physics in the 17th century marks the end of psychology as para-
physics, as science of a natural object, and correlatively the birth of psychology as science of 
subjectivity.  
Those truly responsible for the advent of modern psychology as the science of the 
thinking subject are the mechanical physicists of the 17th century.3  
 If the reality of the world is not confused with the content of perception, if reality is 
obtained and posed vis-à-vis the reduction of illusions of sensible experience, then the 
qualitative residue of this experience engages, in virtue of being possible as falsification of the 
real, the responsibility of spirit, which is to say, of the subject of experience insofar as it does 
not identify itself with mathematical or mechanical reason, instrument of truth and measure 
of reality. 
But this responsibility is, to the eyes of the physicist, culpability. Psychology 
constitutes itself as the enterprise for the exoneration of spirit. Its project is that of a science 
that, in the face of physics, explains why spirit is forced by nature, first and foremost, to trick 
reason with respect to reality. Psychology becomes a physics of external sense in order to 
account for the counter-senses that mechanical physics imputes to the use of the senses in the 
function of knowledge.  
 
The Physics of External Sense 
Psychology, the science of subjectivity, begins as psychophysics for two reasons. First, 
because it cannot be less than a physics if it is to be taken seriously by physicists. Second, 
because it must look in a certain nature—i.e., in the structure of the human body—for the 
reason for the existence of the irreal residues [résidus irréels] of human experience.  
 But even so, this is not a return to the ancient conception of a science of the soul, a 
branch of physics. The new physics is a calculus. Psychology tends to imitate it. It will seek to 
determine the quantitative constants of sensation and the relations between these constants.  
 Here, Descartes and Malebranche are the leaders. In Rules for the Direction of the Mind 
(XII), Descartes proposes the reduction of qualitative differences between sense data to a 
difference between geometric figures. Here, it is a matter of sense data insofar as they are, in 
the proper sense of the term, information from one body to others. And what is informed by 
the external senses is an internal sense: “fantasy, which is nothing more than a real and 
figured body.” In Rule XIV, Descartes expressly deals with what Kant will call the intensive 
magnitude of sensations (Critique of Pure Reason, transcendental analytic, anticipation of 
perception): the comparisons between lights, sounds, etc., which cannot be converted into 
                                                     
3 Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, Déveleoppement historique de la Gestalt-Osychologie, in Thalès, 2nd year (1935), 167-175. 
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exact reports except by analogy with the extension of the figured body. If we add that 
Descartes, even if not properly speaking the inventor of the term and concept of the reflex, 
has nonetheless affirmed the constancy of the link between excitation and reaction, we see 
that psychology—understood as the mathematical physics of external sense—begins with 
him and culminates with Fechner, thanks to the help of physiologists such as Hermann 
Helmholtz, and in spite of and against the Kantian reserves criticized, in turn, by Herbart. 
 This type of psychology is enlarged to the dimensions of an experimental psychology 
by Wundt, whose is motivated by the hope of making appear, in the laws of the “facts of 
consciousness,” the same kind of analytical determinism that mechanics and physics expect 
from any universally valid science. 
Fechner died in 1887, two years before Bergson’s thesis, Time and Free Will: An Essay on 
the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1889). Wundt died in 1920 having formed a good amount 
of disciples (some of whom are still alive), and not without having contributed to the first 
attacks launched by the psychologists of Form against the analytical physics (at once 
experimental and mathematical) of external sense. This was done in accordance with 
Ehrenfels’ observations about the qualities of form (On the Qualities of Form, 1890), which 
themselves resemble Bergson’s analysis of totalities perceived as organic forms that dominate 
their supposed parts (Time and Free Will, ch. II). 
 
The science of internal sense 
But the science of subjectivity does not reduce to the elaboration of a physics of external 
sense. It suggests and presents itself as the science of self-consciousness or the science of 
internal sense. The term psychology dates to the 18th century, having the sense of the science 
of the “I” (Wolff). The entire history of this psychology can be written as the history of the 
counter-senses [des contre-sens] that the Meditations of Descartes initiate without, however, 
assuming responsibility for doing so. 
 When Descartes, at the start of Meditation III, considers his “interior” to render himself 
better known and more familiar to himself, the consideration aims at Thinking. The Cartesian 
interior, consciousness of the Ego cogito, is the direct knowledge the soul has of itself qua pure 
understanding. Descartes calls the Meditations “metaphysical” because they claim to arrive 
directly at the nature and essence of the “I think” in the immediate grasping of its existence. 
Cartesian meditation is not a personal confessional [une confidence personnelle]. The reflection 
that gives self-knowledge the rigor and impersonality of mathematics is not the kind of self-
observation that the spiritualists will to trace back to Socrates beginning in the 19th century, so 
that Mr. Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard can give Napoleon I the assurance that the Know Thyself, 
the Cogito, and Introspection all give the throne and the altar their impregnable foundation.  
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 The Cartesian interior has nothing in common with the internal sense of the 
Aristotelians, “who conceive their objects interiorly and inside the head,” 4  and which 
Descartes considered, as we have seen, as an aspect of the body (Rule XIII). This is why 
Descartes says that the soul knows itself directly and more easily than the body. We overlook 
the explicitly polemical intention of this affirmation too often because, according to 
Aristotelians, the soul does not know itself directly. “Knowledge of the soul is not direct, but 
only by reflection. This is because the soul is similar to the eye that sees everything but cannot 
see itself except by reflection as in a mirror […] and the soul, by parallel, does not see itself 
and does not know itself except by reflection and recognition of its effects.”5 This thesis 
rouses the indignation of Descartes when Gassendi reclaims it in his objections to Meditation 
III, and to which he responds: “It is not the eye that sees itself, or the mirror, but spirit, which 
alone knows the mirror, the eye, and itself.”  
 But this decisive reply does not put an end to this scholastic argument. Maine de Biran 
uses it once more against Descartes in “On the Decomposition of Thought,” and A. Comte 
invokes it against the possibility of introspection, that is to say, against the method of self-
knowledge that Reid borrows from Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard to turn psychology into the 
scientific propaedeutic to metaphysics, thus justifying by experimental means the traditional 
theses of spiritualist substantialism.6 Even Cournot, in all his wisdom, does not hold back 
from also taking up this argument, this time to support the idea that psychological 
observation concerns the behavior of others more than the “I” of the observer, that 
psychology resembles wisdom more than science, and that “it is in the nature of 
psychological facts to be translated into aphorisms rather than theorems.”7  
 One has misunderstood the teachings of Descartes if one constitutes, against him, 
empirical psychology as the natural history of the “I”—from Locke to Ribot, passing through 
Condillac, the French Ideologues and the English Utilitarians—or if one constitutes, after him, 
a rational psychology founded on the intuition of a substantial “I.” 
 To Kant still belongs the glory of having established that even if Wolff was able to 
baptize his post-Cartesian newborns (Psychologia empirica, 1732; Psychologia rationalis, 1734), he 
was nonetheless unable to successfully found their pretensions to legitimacy. Kant shows, on 
the one hand, that phenomenal internal sense is just a form of empirical intuition, which he 
tends to confuse with time. On the other, he shows that the “I” that is the subject of all 
judgment of apperception is itself a function of the organization of experience, but one of 
which there can be no science because it is the transcendental condition for all science. The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) challenges the scientific scope of psychology, 
                                                     
4 Scipion Du Pleix, op. cit., Physique, 439. 
5 Ibid., 353. 
6 Cours de Philosophie positive, 1re leçon.  
7 Cournot, Essai sur le fondements de nos connaissance (1851), §§371-376. 
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whether based on the image of mathematics or physics. No mathematical psychology is 
possible in the same way that there exists a mathematical physics. Even if one, in virtue of 
anticipating perception relative to intensive magnitudes, applied the mathematics of the 
continuous to the modifications of internal sense, one would not thereby obtain anything 
more than a geometry confined to the study of the properties of the straight line. There is also 
no experimental psychology in the same way that there is a chemistry that constitutes itself 
by the use of analysis and synthesis. We cannot experiment on others or ourselves. Plus, 
internal observation affects its object. Wanting to surprise oneself in self-observation would 
lead to insanity [alienation]. Psychology, then, can only be descriptive. Its true place is in an 
Anthropology, as a propaedeutic to a theory of skill and prudence, crowned by a theory of 
wisdom.  
 
The science of intimate sense 
If we call “classical psychology” what we intent to refute, it must be noted that in psychology 
there are always classics for someone. The Ideologues, heirs to the sensualists, took as 
“classical” the Scottish psychology that only advocated, like them, an inductive method so as 
to better affirm, against them, the substantiality of spirit. And, before being rejected as 
“classical” by the theoreticians of Gestalt psychology, the atomistic and analytic psychology 
of the sensualists and the Ideologues was itself already viewed as such by a romantic 
psychologist like Maine de Biran. Through him, psychology becomes the technique of the 
Diary and the science of intimate sense. The solitude of Descartes was the asceticism of a 
mathematician. The solitude of Maine de Biran is the idleness of a school principal. The 
Cartesian I think founds thought itself. The Biranian I want founds self-consciousness over 
and against an exteriority. At his isolated desk, Biran discovers that psychological analysis 
does not consist in simplifying but in complicating; that the primitive psychic fact is not an 
element but already a relation, and that this relation is lived with effort. He arrives at two 
conclusions, unexpected for a man whose functions are of authority, which is to say, 
commandment: consciousness requires the conflict between a power and a resistance; man is 
not, as de Bonald thought, an intelligence serviced by the organs but a living organization 
serviced by intelligence. It is necessary for the soul to be incarnated, and so there can be no 
psychology without biology. Self-observation does not forgo recourse to either the physiology 
of voluntary movement or the pathology of affectivity. The situation of Maine de Biran is 
unique, between the two Royer-Collards. He has dialogued with the doctrinarian and been 
judged by the psychiatrist. We have from Maine de Biran a “Promenade avec M. Royer-
Collard dans les jardins du Luxembourg” and we have from Antoine-Athanase Royer-
Collard, the former’s younger brother, an “Examen de la Doctrine de Maine de Biran.”8 If 
                                                     
8 Published by his son Hyacinthe Royer-Collard (in Annales Médico-Psychologiques, Book 2 (1843), 1). 
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Maine de Biran had not read and discussed Cabanis (On the Relations between the Physical and 
Moral Aspects in Man, 1798), if he had not read and discussed Bichat (Physiological Researches 
on Life and Death, 1800), the history of pathological psychology would ignore him, which it 
cannot do. The second Royer-Collard is, after Pinel and alongside Esquirol, one of the 
founders of the French school of psychiatry. Pinel had pleaded for the idea that the insane are 
at once sick patients like the rest, neither possessed nor criminals, and also different from 
them and should be cared for separately and separated, depending on the case, into 
specialized hospital services. Pinel founded mental medicine as an independent discipline, 
starting from the therapeutic isolation of the insane at Bicêtre and Salpêtrière. Royer-Collard 
imitates Pinel at the Maison Nationale de Charenton, where he becomes head doctor in 1805, 
the same year Esquirol defends his medical thesis on The Passions Considered as Causes, 
Symptoms and Means of Cure in Cases of Insanity. Royer-Collard becomes, in 1816, professor of 
legal medicine at the Faculty of Medicine of Paris and, in 1821, the first holder of the chair of 
mental medicine. Royer-Collard and Esquirol had as pupils: Calmeil, who studied paralysis 
in the insane; Bayle, who recognized and isolated general paralysis; Félix Voisin, who created 
the study of mental retardation in infants. And it is at Salpêtrière that—after Pinel, Esquirol, 
Lelut, Baillarger, and Falret, among others—Charcot becomes, in 1862, the leader of a service 
whose works will be followed by Théodule Ribot, Pierre Janet, cardinal Mercier, and 
Sigmund Freud.  
 We have seen psycho-pathology positively begin with Galen and culminate in 
Sigmund Freud, creator of the term “psychoanalysis” in 1896. Psycho-pathology did not 
develop in isolation from the other psychological disciplines. Because of the investigations of 
Biran, it compelled philosophy to ask itself, since at least a century before, from which of the 
two Royer-Collards it should borrow the idea of psychology that we must develop. In this 
way, psycho-pathology is at once judge and party to that uninterrupted debate in which 
metaphysics gives direction to psychology without thereby giving up the right to say a word 
about the relationship between the physical and the psychic. For a long time, this relationship 
has been formulated as somato-physical before becoming psycho-somatic. This reversal is the 
same, moreover, as the one carried out on the signification of the unconscious. If one 
identifies psychism and consciousness—based, rightly or wrongly, on the authority of 
Descartes—, the unconscious turns out to be of a physical order. If one assumes that the 
psychic can be unconscious, psychology does not reduce to the science of consciousness. And 
the psychic is no longer only what is hidden, but also what hides itself, that which one hides; 
it is not simply the intimate, but also—a term Bossuet takes from the mystics—the abyssal. 
Psychology is no longer just the science of intimacy, but the science of the profundities of the 
soul.  
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Psychology as science of reactions and of behavior 
In proposing to define Man [l’homme] as a living organization serviced by intelligence, Maine 
de Biran marked in advance—better, apparently, than Gall who thought, according to Lelut, 
that “man is no longer an intelligence but a will serviced by the organs”9—the terrain on 
which a new psychology would be constituted in the 19th century. But, at the same time, he 
assigned it its limits since, in his Anthropology, he situated human life between animal and 
spiritual life.  
 The 19th century sees the biology of human behavior emerge (alongside psychology) as 
a nervous and mental pathology, as the physics of external sense, as the science of internal 
and intimate sense. The reasons for this emergence seem to be the following. First, scientific 
reasons to know: the constitution of Biology as a general theory of the relations between 
organisms and their milieus, which marks the end of belief in the existence of a separate 
human reign. Then, technical and economic reasons to know: the development of an 
industrial regime that directs attention to the industrious character of the human species and 
marks the end of belief in the dignity of speculative thought. And, finally, political reasons 
that mark the end of belief in values of social privilege and result in the diffusion of 
egalitarianism: conscription and public education become State affairs, and the demand for 
equality in military positions and civil functions (to each according to his job, works, or 
merits) becomes the real, though often overlooked, foundation of a phenomenon proper to 
modern societies, that is to say, the generalized practice of expertise, in every sense of the 
word, as the determination of competence and the test for simulation.  
 At any rate, what characterizes this psychology of behavior, in comparison to other 
types of psychological investigation, is its constitutional incapacity to grasp and present with 
clarity its founding project. If among the founding projects of previous types of psychology, 
there are some that pass for philosophical counter-senses [des contre-sens philosophiques], here, 
to the contrary—all links to philosophical theory having been refused—the issue is to figure 
out from where a given psychological investigation gets its sense. In accepting to become, 
under the sponsorship of biology, an objective science of aptitudes, reactions, and behaviors, 
psychology and psychologists completely forget to situate their own specific behaviors in the 
context of their historical circumstances and the social milieus in which they propose their 
methods or techniques, and in which they make their services accepted.  
 Nietzsche, adumbrating the psychology of the 19th century psychologist, writes: “We, 
psychologists of the future, view the instrument that wishes to know itself almost as a sign of 
degeneration; we are the instruments of knowledge and we would like to have all the naïveté 
and precision of an instrument; so we must not analyze ourselves, know ourselves.” 10 
                                                     
9 Qu’est-ce que la phrénologie? Ou Essai sur la signification et la valeur des systèmes de psychologie en général et de celui 
de Gall, en particulier, (Paris, 1836), 401. 
10 Nietzsche, La volonté de puissance, translated by Bianquis, Book 3, §335. 
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Astonishing misunderstanding, and how revealing too! The psychologist only wants to be an 
instrument, without knowing of what or of whom. Nietzsche seemed more inspired when, at 
the start of The Genealogy of Morality, he applied himself to the enigma represented by English 
psychologists, that is to say, the utilitarians who were preoccupied with the genesis of moral 
sentiments. He wondered what had pushed them in the direction of cynicism when 
explaining human behavior in terms of interest and utility, and in the direction of forgetting 
these fundamental motivations. It is precisely here that, in the face of the behavior of the 
psychologists of the 19th century, Nietzsche provisionally renounces all cynicism, which is to 
say, all lucidity! 
 The idea of utility, as a principle of psychology, is linked to the philosophical 
understanding of human nature as a power of artifice [comme puissance d’artifice] (Hume, 
Burke) or, more prosaically, to the definition of Man as a toolmaker (the French 
Encyclopédistes, Adam Smith, Franklin). But the principle of a biological psychology of 
behavior does not seem to have been disengaged, in the same fashion, from an explicitly 
philosophical conscience, without a doubt because this principle can be activated only on the 
condition that it remain unformulated. This principle is the definition of Man himself as tool. 
Utilitarianism (which implicates the idea of utility for man, the idea of Man as judge of 
utility) was succeeded by instrumentalism (which implicates the idea of the utility of man, the 
idea of Man as mean to utility). Intelligence is no longer what organizes the organs and avails 
itself of them, but what services them. And it is not with impunity that the historical origins 
of the psychology of reaction must be sought in the works produced by the discovery of “the 
personal equation” of astronomers using the telescope (Maskelyne, 1796). Man was studied 
first as the instrument of the scientific instrument, before being studied as the instrument of 
all instruments.  
 The investigations of the laws of adaptation and learning, of the detection and 
measurement of aptitudes, and of the conditions of output and productivity (whether 
concerning individuals or groups)—investigations that are inseparable from their 
applications to selection or orientation—admit a common implicit postulate: the nature of 
Man is to be a tool, and his vocation is to be put in his place, to his task.  
 Nietzsche, of course, is right to say that the psychologists would like to be the “naïve 
and precise instruments” of this study of man. They have struggled to reach objective 
knowledge, even if the determinism they seek in behavior is no longer the sort of Newtonian 
determinism familiar to the first physicists of the 19th century, but rather a statistical 
determinism, progressively resting on the findings of biometrics. But what is the sense of this 
instrumentalism to the second power? What is it that pushes or inclines psychologists to 
appoint themselves, of all men, the instruments of an ambition to treat Man as an instrument?  
 In the other types of psychology, the soul or the subject—as natural form or 
consciousness of interiority—is the principle used to justify the value a certain idea of Man 
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relative to the truth of things. But for a psychology in which the word “soul” causes flight 
and the word “consciousness” laughter, the truth of Man is captured by the fact that there is 
no longer any idea of Man as anything other than a tool. We must recognize that to talk about 
the idea of a tool, it is necessary that not every idea belong to the rank of a tool; and that in 
order to assign a value to a tool, it is precisely necessary that not every value be that of a tool 
whose subordinate value consists in procuring some other thing. Now, if the psychologist 
cannot derive his psychological project from an idea of man, does he think he can justify this 
project with his behavior of the utilization of man? We say it well, “his behavior of 
utilization,” in spite of two possible objections. Someone could say that, in a way, this type of 
psychology does not ignore the distinction between theory and application and, in another 
way, that this utilization is not ultimately the doing of the psychologist himself but of the 
person or persons who ask him for reports and diagnostics. We will respond that, unless one 
is going to confuse the theoretician of psychology with the professor of psychology, one must 
recognize that the contemporary psychologist is, more often than not, a practicing 
professional whose “science” is completely motivated by that search for “laws” of adaptation 
to a socio-technological environment—not to a natural environment—, for that which confers 
on his operations of “measure” a signification of evaluation and a range of expertise. In this 
way the behavior of the psychologist of human behavior involves, almost by necessity, a 
feeling of superiority, a good dirigist conscience, the mentality of a manager of the relations 
between man and man. That is why we must go back to the cynical question: who designates 
psychologists as the instruments of instrumentalism? How do we recognize those men who 
are worthy of assigning to instrument-man [l’homme-instrument] his role and function? Who 
counsels the counselors? 
 Needless to say, we do not place ourselves on the terrain of capacities and technique. 
Whether there are good or bad psychologists—that is to say, technicians skilled due to 
learning and technicians noxious due to stupidity not forbidden by law—is not the issue. The 
issue is that a science or a scientific technique do not contain, within themselves, any idea that 
could confer them their sense. In his Introduction to Psychology, Paul Guillaume described the 
psychology of a man taking a test. The subject [le testé] defends himself against this 
investigation, fearing that an action is being exercise over it. Guillaume sees in this state of 
mind an acknowledgement of the efficacy of the test. But one could also see here the embryo 
of the psychology of the tester. The defense of the subject being tested is the repugnance of 
seeing itself treated like an insect by a man who is not recognized as having the authority to 
tell him what he is or what he must do. “To treat like an insect,” the word is from Stendhal, who 
Canguilhem: What is Psychology? 
 
212 
 
takes it from Cuvier.11 What if we treated the psychologist like an insect? What if we applied 
to the dismal and insipid Kinsey, for example, Stendhal’s recommendation? 
 In other words, in 19th and 20th centuries, the psychology of reaction and behavior 
thought it made itself independent by separating itself form all philosophy, that is to say, 
from the kind of speculation that looks for an idea of Man beyond the biological and 
sociological facts. But this psychology could not prevent the recurrence of its results in the 
behavior of those who obtain them. And, to the extend that one forbids philosophy from 
furnishing the answer, the question “What is psychology?” becomes “In doing what they do, 
what do psychologists hope to accomplish?” “In the name of what are they instituted 
psychologists?” When Gideon takes command as the head  of the Israelites and  escorts  the 
Midianites beyond the Jordan (The Bible: Judges, Book VII), he uses a test of two degrees that 
permits him to keep only ten thousand out of thirty-two thousand men, and then three 
hundred out of ten thousand. But this test owes to the Eternal the finalization of its use and 
the process of selection used. To select a selector, it is normally necessary to transcend the 
blueprint of technical selection procedures. In the immanence of scientific psychology, the 
question remains: Who has, not the competence, but the mission of being a psychologist? 
Psychology always relies on an doubling up [dédoublement], but this is no longer the doubling 
of consciousness (according to the facts and norms entailed by the idea of man); it is the 
doubling of a mass of “subjects” and of an elite corporation of specialists who invest 
themselves with their proper mission.  
 In Kant and Maine de Biran, psychology situates itself in an Anthropology, which is to 
say—despite the ambiguity, much in vogue today, of this term—in a philosophy. In Kant, the 
general theory of human ability is still connected to a theory of wisdom [sagesse]. 
Instrumental psychology presents itself as a general theory of ability outside any reference to 
wisdom. If we cannot define this psychology via an idea of man, that is to say, if we cannot 
situate psychology within philosophy, we do not have the power to prevent anyone from just 
considering themselves “psychologists” and calling whatever they do “psychology.” But 
neither can we prevent philosophy from continuing to interrogate the ill-defined status of 
psychology, ill-defined from the viewpoint of the sciences as much as from that of techniques. 
In doing this, philosophy carries itself with a constitutive ingenuity that is so different from 
gullibility that it does not exclude a provisional cynicism. This ingenuity leads philosophy to 
return, once again, to the common sector, to the side of non-specialists.  
 It is rather vulgarly, then, that philosophy poses to psychology the question: tell me 
what you aim for so that I may find out what you are? But a philosopher can also address 
                                                     
11 “Instead of hating the small bookseller of the neighboring town who sells the Popular Almanac, I used to say to 
my friend Mr. de Ranville to apply to him the remedy indicated by Cuvier: treat him like an insect. Find out 
what are his means of sustenance, try to guess his ways of making love” (Stendhal, Mémoires d’un Touriste, 
Calmann-Lévy (ed.), Book 2, page 23). 
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himself to the psychologist in the form of offering orientation advice (one time does not a 
habit make!), and say to him: when one leaves the Sorbonne by the street Saint-Jacques, one 
can ascend or descend; if one ascends, one approaches the Pantheon, the conservatory of 
great men; but if one descends, one heads directly to the Police Department.    
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